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Expropriation vs. Proportional Sharing in Corporate Acquisitions

Author

Listed:
  • Mara Faccio

    (Vanderbilt University, Owen Graduate School of Management)

  • David Stolin

    (Toulouse Business School)

Abstract

An important and growing literature in finance points to existence of considerable benefits to being a controlling shareholder. At the same time, the well-established literature on mergers finds these key corporate events to be subject to agency costs. Relying on these two arguments, we employ a novel application of the Bertrand et al. (2002) insight to study the hypothesis that controlling shareholders use acquisitions to expropriate resources to their benefit. The findings do not allow us to reject the null hypothesis of proportional sharing of acquisition gains in favor of the alternative hypothesis of expropriation of bidder's minority shareholders.

Suggested Citation

  • Mara Faccio & David Stolin, 2006. "Expropriation vs. Proportional Sharing in Corporate Acquisitions," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(3), pages 1413-1444, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:79:y:2006:i:3:p:1413-1444
    DOI: 10.1086/500680
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Chilosi, Alberto & Damiani, Mirella, 2007. "Stakeholders vs. shareholders in corporate governance," MPRA Paper 2334, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Martynova, Marina & Renneboog, Luc, 2011. "Evidence on the international evolution and convergence of corporate governance regulations," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 1531-1557.
    3. Martynova, Marina & Renneboog, Luc, 2008. "A century of corporate takeovers: What have we learned and where do we stand?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(10), pages 2148-2177, October.
    4. Mager, Ferdinand & Meyer-Fackler, Martin, 2017. "Mergers and acquisitions in Germany: 1981–2010," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 32-42.
    5. Paul André & Walid Ben-Amar & Samir Saadi, 2014. "Family firms and high technology Mergers & Acquisitions," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 18(1), pages 129-158, February.
    6. Marina Martynova & Luc Renneboog, 2011. "The Performance of the European Market for Corporate Control: Evidence from the Fifth Takeover Wave," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 17(2), pages 208-259, March.
    7. Cappa, Francesco & Oriani, Raffaele & Pinelli, Michele & De Massis, Alfredo, 2019. "When does crowdsourcing benefit firm stock market performance?," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(9), pages 1-1.
    8. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5922 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Yen, Tze-Yu & Andre, Paul, 2007. "Ownership structure and operating performance of acquiring firms: The case of English-origin countries," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 59(5), pages 380-405.
    10. Liu, Jia & Lister, Roger & Pang, Dong, 2013. "Corporate evolution following initial public offerings in China: A life-course approach," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 1-20.
    11. Adrian Pop & Diana Pop, 2014. "How fair are the fair price standards in blockholder regimes?," Working Papers hal-01076722, HAL.
    12. Sungbin Cho & Kyung†Mook Lim, 2018. "Tunneling by Related†party Transactions: Evidence from Korean Conglomerates," Asian Economic Journal, East Asian Economic Association, vol. 32(2), pages 147-164, June.
    13. Cheung, Yan-Leung & Qi, Yuehua & Raghavendra Rau, P. & Stouraitis, Aris, 2009. "Buy high, sell low: How listed firms price asset transfers in related party transactions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 914-924, May.
    14. Kinshuk Saurabh, 2023. "Expropriation mechanisms, corporate governance, and cross-border acquisitions by Indian firms," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 20(4), pages 395-409, December.
    15. Caprio, Lorenzo & Croci, Ettore & Del Giudice, Alfonso, 2011. "Ownership structure, family control, and acquisition decisions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 1636-1657.
    16. Thraya, Mohamed Firas & Hamza, Taher, 2019. "Bidder excess control, target overpayment and control contestability: Evidence from France," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 178-190.
    17. Ettore Croci & Alfonso Del Giudice, 2014. "Delistings, Controlling Shareholders and Firm Performance in Europe," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 20(2), pages 374-405, March.

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