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Do Bondholders Lose from Junk Bond Covenant Changes

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  • Kahan, Marcel
  • Tuckman, Bruce

Abstract

This article documents that firms can and do change the covenants of their public debt indentures through consent solicitations. A game-theoretic model shows that bondholders may consent to covenant changes even when it is not in their collective interest to do so. Despite this finding, bondholder returns around solicitations are positive. Further analysis indicates that bondholders coordinate their actions to modify or defeat disadvantageous proposals and, therefore, can demand some of the gains resulting from covenant modifications. The policy implication of this study is that bondholders may not need additional regulatory or judicial protection in the solicitation process. Copyright 1993 by University of Chicago Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Kahan, Marcel & Tuckman, Bruce, 1993. "Do Bondholders Lose from Junk Bond Covenant Changes," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66(4), pages 499-516, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:66:y:1993:i:4:p:499-516
    DOI: 10.1086/296615
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    Cited by:

    1. Maul, D. & Schiereck, D., 2017. "The bond event study methodology since 1974," Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) 80723, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL).
    2. Jamie A. Anderson-Parson & Terrill R. Keasler & Robin T. Byerly, 2015. "Bond Indenture Consent Solicitations as a Debt Management Tool," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 3(3), pages 1-14, July.
    3. Hege, U. & Mella-Barral, P., 1999. "Collateral, Renegotiation and the Value of Diffusely Held Debt," Discussion Paper 1999-94, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    4. Reisel, Natalia, 2014. "On the value of restrictive covenants: Empirical investigation of public bond issues," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 251-268.
    5. repec:mul:jdp901:doi:10.12831/73633:y:2013:i:1:p:51-65 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Mann, Steven V. & Powers, Eric A., 2007. "Determinants of bond tender premiums and the percentage tendered," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 547-566, March.
    7. Zhang, Zhipeng, 2009. "Recovery Rates and Macroeconomic Conditions: The Role of Loan Covenants," MPRA Paper 17521, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Michelle J. White, 2005. "Economic Analysis of Corporate and Personal Bankruptcy Law," NBER Working Papers 11536, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Hege, Ulrich, 2003. "Workouts, court-supervised reorganization and the choice between private and public debt," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 233-269, March.
    10. Chatterjee, Sris & Dhillon, Upinder S. & Ramirez, Gabriel G., 1995. "Coercive tender and exchange offers in distressed high-yield debt restructurings An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 333-360, July.
    11. Armando Gomes, 2024. "Takeovers, Freezeouts, and Risk Arbitrage," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(1), pages 1-27, January.
    12. Flavio Bazzana & Eleonora Broccardo, 2013. "The role of bondholder coordination in freeze-out exchange offers," Journal of Financial Management, Markets and Institutions, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 1, pages 67-84, January.
    13. Armo Gomes, 2001. "Takeovers, Freezeouts, and Risk Arbitrage," Penn CARESS Working Papers c4679b705ea88aebda985c6da, Penn Economics Department.
    14. Billett, Matthew T. & Yang, Ke, 2016. "Bond tender offers in mergers and acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 128-141.
    15. Daniels, Kenneth & Ramirez, Gabriel G., 2007. "Debt restructurings, holdouts, and exit consents," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 1-17, April.
    16. de Jong, Abe & Roosenboom, Peter & Schramade, Willem, 2009. "Who benefits from bond tender offers in Europe?," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 355-369, December.

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