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The Selective Enforcement of Government Regulations: Battleground States, State Regulators, and the Environmental Protection Agency

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  • Huseyin Gulen
  • Brett W. Myers

Abstract

The Electoral College creates incentives for politicians and regulators to direct policy favors toward battleground or swing states. We examine whether this affects regulatory enforcement and find that facilities in battleground states are less likely to be found in violation of the Clean Water Act, partially because the permit limits for facilities in these states are less restrictive. Identification is obtained by analyzing violation rates of similar facilities located along the border between battleground and nonbattleground states.

Suggested Citation

  • Huseyin Gulen & Brett W. Myers, 2024. "The Selective Enforcement of Government Regulations: Battleground States, State Regulators, and the Environmental Protection Agency," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67(1), pages 225-263.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/728369
    DOI: 10.1086/728369
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