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Noncompete Agreements in the US Labor Force

Author

Listed:
  • Evan P. Starr
  • J.J. Prescott
  • Norman D. Bishara

Abstract

Using nationally representative survey data on 11,505 labor force participants, we examine the use and implementation of noncompete agreements and the employee outcomes associated with these provisions. Approximately 18 percent of labor force participants are bound by noncompetes, with 38 percent having agreed to at least one in the past. Noncompetes are more likely to be found in high-skill, high-paying jobs, but they are also common in low-skill, low-paying jobs and in states where noncompetes are unenforceable. Only 10 percent of employees negotiate over their noncompetes, and about one-third of employees are presented with noncompetes after having already accepted job offers. Early-notice noncompetes are associated with better employee outcomes, while employees who agree to late-notice noncompetes are comparatively worse off. Regardless of noncompete timing, however, wages are relatively lower where noncompetes are easier to enforce. We discuss these findings in light of competing theories of the economic value of noncompetes.

Suggested Citation

  • Evan P. Starr & J.J. Prescott & Norman D. Bishara, 2021. "Noncompete Agreements in the US Labor Force," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(1), pages 53-84.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/712206
    DOI: 10.1086/712206
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    Cited by:

    1. Tristan Potter & Bart Hobijn & André Kurmann, 2024. "On the inefficiency of non‐competes in low‐wage labour markets," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 91(362), pages 446-496, April.
    2. Deschamps, Pierre & De Sousa, José, 2021. "Labor mobility and racial discrimination," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    3. Weiyi Ng & Toby E. Stuart, 2022. "Acquired employees versus hired employees: Retained or turned over?," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(5), pages 1025-1045, May.
    4. Dodini, Samuel, 2023. "The spillover effects of labor regulations on the structure of earnings and employment: Evidence from occupational licensing," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 225(C).
    5. Michael Lipsitz & Evan Starr, 2022. "Low-Wage Workers and the Enforceability of Noncompete Agreements," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(1), pages 143-170, January.
    6. Wenting Ma, 2024. "Employer Dominance and Worker Earnings in Finance," Working Papers 24-41, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    7. Mueller, Clemens, 2023. "Non-Compete Agreements and Labor Allocation Across Product Markets," VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage" 277621, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Brummund, Peter & Makowsky, Michael D., 2024. "Monopsony and Local Religious Clubs: Evidence from Indonesia," IZA Discussion Papers 16999, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    9. Chen Yeh & Claudia Macaluso & Brad Hershbein, 2022. "Monopsony in the US Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(7), pages 2099-2138, July.
    10. Eric Bartelsman & Sabien Dobbelaere & Alessandro Zona Mattioli, 2024. "Non-Compete Agreements, Tacit Knowledge and Market Imperfections," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 24-055/V, Tinbergen Institute.
    11. Andrew Leigh, 2023. "How uncompetitive markets hurt workers," Australian Journal of Labour Economics (AJLE), Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre (BCEC), Curtin Business School, vol. 26(1), pages 1-21.
    12. Hoey, Sam & Peeters, Thomas & Principe, Francesco, 2021. "The transfer system in European football: A pro-competitive no-poaching agreement?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    13. Adam Feher, 2024. "Guarding Expertise and Assets: Non-competition Agreements and Their Implications," IAAEU Discussion Papers 202404, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
    14. Sabety, Adrienne, 2023. "The value of relationships in healthcare," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 225(C).
    15. Contigiani, Andrea & Testoni, Marco, 2023. "Geographic isolation, trade secrecy, and innovation," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(8).
    16. Kurt Lavetti, 2021. "Noncompete agreements in employment contracts," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 486-486, September.
    17. Joye Khoo & Adrian (Wai Kong) Cheung, 2023. "Does skilled labor risk matter to suppliers? Evidence from trade credit," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 58(2), pages 423-447, May.
    18. Callaci, Brian & Gibson, Matthew & Pinto, Sergio & Steinbaum, Marshall & Walsh, Matt, 2023. "The Effect of Franchise No-Poaching Restrictions on Worker Earnings," IZA Discussion Papers 16330, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    19. Bartelsman, Eric & Dobbelaere, Sabien & Mattioli, Alessandro Zona, 2024. "Non-compete Agreements, Tacit Knowledge and Market Imperfections," IZA Discussion Papers 17260, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    20. Julian Alves & Jason Greenberg & Yaxin Guo & Ravija Harjai & Bruno Serra-Lorenzo & John Van Reenen, 2024. "Labour market power: New evidence on Non-Compete Agreements and the effects of M&A in the UK," CEP Discussion Papers dp1976, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    21. Dan A. Black & Lars Skipper & Jeffrey A. Smith & Jeffrey Andrew Smith, 2023. "Firm Training," CESifo Working Paper Series 10268, CESifo.
    22. Jason Sockin, 2022. "Show Me the Amenity: Are Higher-Paying Firms Better All Around?," CESifo Working Paper Series 9842, CESifo.
    23. Oz Shy & Rune Stenbacka, 2023. "Noncompete agreements, training, and wage competition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 328-347, April.
    24. Tore Ellingsen & Eirik Gaard Kristiansen, 2022. "Fair and Square: A Retention Model of Managerial Compensation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(5), pages 3604-3624, May.

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