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Tragedy, Property Rights, and the Commons: Investigating the Causal Relationship from Institutions to Ecosystem Collapse

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  • Elisabeth Thuestad Isaksen
  • Andries Richter

Abstract

Do private property rights mitigate overexploitation of common pool resources and, if so, under which circumstances? In this paper, we examine the effects of private property rights on the status of marine fisheries by combining data on ecological, economic, and institutional characteristics into a panel data set, spanning over 50 years, 170 exclusive economic zones, and 800 species. To address the inherent endogeneity problem of policy implementation, we employ both a difference-in-differences (DiD) and instrumental variable (IV) strategy. Results from both estimations suggest that property rights lower the probability of a fish stock collapsing, but the effect varies with country and species characteristics. Specifically, we find evidence suggesting that property rights are more effective when ownership is transferable, the general level of ownership protection is strong, trade openness is high, the regenerative capacity of the resource is high, and the species value is high.

Suggested Citation

  • Elisabeth Thuestad Isaksen & Andries Richter, 2019. "Tragedy, Property Rights, and the Commons: Investigating the Causal Relationship from Institutions to Ecosystem Collapse," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(4), pages 741-781.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jaerec:doi:10.1086/703578
    DOI: 10.1086/703578
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    Cited by:

    1. Juan Rosas-Munoz & José Antonio Carrillo-Viramontes, 2022. "Abundance of Resources and Incentives for Collusion in Fisheries," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(22), pages 1-20, November.
    2. Shuning Zhu & Jinlong Liu & Hao Xu & Lingchao Li & Wentao Yang, 2022. "Has China’s New Round of Collective Forest Reforms Reduced Forest Fragmentation? A Case Study of the Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei Region," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(10), pages 1-15, May.
    3. Miller, Steve, 2020. "Causal forest estimation of heterogeneous and time-varying environmental policy effects," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
    4. Lingling Hou & Pengfei Liu & Xiaohui Tian, 2023. "Grassland tenure reform and grassland quality in China," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 105(5), pages 1388-1404, October.
    5. Ho, Phuong, 2021. "Why Is Trading So Important in Cap and Trade? The Role of Economies of Scale and Productivity," SocArXiv 9ce2v, Center for Open Science.
    6. De Geest, Lawrence R. & Kidwai, Abdul H. & Portillo, Javier E., 2022. "Ours, not yours: Property rights, poaching and deterrence in common-pool resources," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    7. Riekhof, Marie-Catherine & Noack, Frederik, 2024. "Nature’s decline and recovery — Structural change, regulatory costs, and the onset of resource use regulation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    8. Rosas-Munoz, Juan & Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Munoz-Garcia, Felix, 2024. "When should the regulator be left alone in the commons? How fishing cooperatives can help ameliorate inefficiencies," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).

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