IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/restat/v80y1998i4p629-637.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Economic Dynamics And Government Stability In Postwar Italy

Author

Listed:
  • Antonio Merlo

Abstract

In this paper I estimate a duration model of the Italian government. The main finding of the paper is that the downfall probability of an Italian government depends on both political and economic factors. In particular, the higher the inflation rate and the higher the number of workhours lost in strikes both at the time a government forms and during its tenure in office, the more likely it is for a government to collapse. This result has important consequences for the validity of political theories of the business cycle. © 1998 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technolog

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Merlo, 1998. "Economic Dynamics And Government Stability In Postwar Italy," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(4), pages 629-637, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:80:y:1998:i:4:p:629-637
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/003465398557717
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2003. "The Effects of Constitutions on Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-037, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    2. David P Baron, 2018. "Elections and durable governments in parliamentary governments," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 30(1), pages 74-118, January.
    3. Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2002. "Bicameralism and Government Formation, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-010, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Feb 2007.
    4. Sven de Vries & Rakesh Vohra, 2000. "A Structural Model of Government Formation," Discussion Papers 1297, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    5. André Corrêa d’Almeida & Paulo Reis Mourão, 2015. "The Irrelevance of Political Parties’ Differences for Public Finances - Evidence from Public Deficit and Debt in Portugal (1974 – 2012)," NIPE Working Papers 11/2015, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    6. Diermeier, Daniel & Eraslan, Hülya & Merlo, Antonio, 2007. "Bicameralism and Government Formation," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 2(3), pages 227-252, August.
    7. Carmignani, Fabrizio, 2009. "The distributive effects of institutional quality when government stability is endogenous," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 409-421, December.
    8. Fabrizio Carmignani, 2001. "Political Data for Applied Political Economy Research," Working Papers 43, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2001.
    9. Diermeier, Daniel & Eraslan, Hulya & Merlo, Antonio, 2002. "Coalition governments and comparative constitutional design," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 893-907, May.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:80:y:1998:i:4:p:629-637. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: The MIT Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://direct.mit.edu/journals .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.