The Wait-and-See Option in Ascending Price Auctions
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Cited by:
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2007.
"Auctions and information acquisition: sealed bid or dynamic formats?,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(2), pages 355-372, June.
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2005. "Auctions and Information acquisition: Sealed-bid or Dynamic Formats?," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000495, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2007. "Auctions and Informaton Acquisition: Sealed-bid or Dynamic Formats?," Post-Print halshs-00754227, HAL.
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2007. "Auctions and Informaton Acquisition: Sealed-bid or Dynamic Formats?," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754227, HAL.
- Rasmusen Eric Bennett, 2006.
"Strategic Implications of Uncertainty over One's Own Private Value in Auctions,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-24, November.
- Eric B. Rasmusen, 2001. "Starategic Implications of Uncertainty Over One's Own Private Value in Auctions," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-127, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Eric Rasmusen, 2004. "Strategic Implications of Uncertainty Over One’s Own Private Value in Auctions," Working Papers 2004-13, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
- Laurent Lamy, 2009. "Ascending auctions: some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discounts," PSE Working Papers halshs-00575076, HAL.
- B Kelsey Jack, 2009. "Auctioning Conservation Contracts in Indonesia - Participant Learning in Multiple Trial Rounds," CID Working Papers 35, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
- Tanjim Hossain, 2008. "Learning by bidding," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 509-529, June.
- Leonardo Rezende, 2018. "Mid-auction information acquisition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(3), pages 751-780, May.
- David Ettinger & Fabio Michelucci, 2016.
"Hiding Information in Open Auctions with Jump Bids,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 126(594), pages 1484-1502, August.
- David Ettinger & Fabio Michelucci, 2016. "Hiding Information in Open Auctions with Jump Bids," Post-Print hal-01432853, HAL.
- Laurent Lamy, 2009. "Ascending auctions: some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discounts," Working Papers halshs-00575076, HAL.
- Vitali Gretschko & Jasmina Simon, 2024. "An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism with Covert Information Acquisition," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_616, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Vadovič, Radovan, 2017. "Bidding behavior and price search in Internet auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 125-147.
- Yossi Shvimer & Avi Herbon, 2020. "Tradability, closeness to market prices, and expected profit: their measurement for a binomial model of options pricing in a heterogeneous market," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 15(3), pages 737-762, July.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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