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Microcredit And Mechanism Design

Author

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  • Robert M. Townsend

    (University of Chicago,)

Abstract

Individual microcredit loans are not necessarily simple fixed debt obligations, but rather may have contingencies and procedures suggested by the theory of mechanism design. Further, group or joint-liability lending may not be the single miracle cure practitioners claim nor operate the way the logic of a single theory might suggest. There are multiple theories, these theories can be distinguished in data on repayment rates, and the best-fit theory may vary with the environment. Finally, the debate about whether to lend to individuals or lend to groups may be misplaced. Under simple theories of selection, the Pareto superior regime, which is predicted to emerge, varies with exogenous environmental characteristics. (JEL: D5, D82, G2, O17) Copyright (c) 2003 The European Economic Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert M. Townsend, 2003. "Microcredit And Mechanism Design," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(2-3), pages 468-477, 04/05.
    • Handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:1:y:2003:i:2-3:p:468-477
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Renaud Bourlès & Dominique Henriet, 2012. "Risk-sharing Contracts with Asymmetric Information," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 37(1), pages 27-56, March.
    2. Casey B. Mulligan, 2012. "Do Welfare Policies Matter for Labor Market Aggregates? Quantifying Safety Net Work Incentives since 2007," NBER Working Papers 18088, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Renaud Bourlès & Anastasia Cozarenco, 2014. "State intervention and the microcredit market: the role of business development services," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 43(4), pages 931-944, December.
    4. Lutz G. Arnold & Benedikt Booker, 2012. "Good Intentions Pave the Way to ... the Local Moneylender," Working Papers 126, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
    5. Arnold, Lutz G. & Booker, Benedikt, 2013. "Good intentions pave the way to … the local moneylender," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(3), pages 466-469.
    6. Alem, Mauro & Jorge Elias, Julio, 2018. "Allocating production risks through credit cum insurance contracts: the design and implementation of a fund for small cotton growers to access market finance," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association, vol. 21(2), March.
    7. Madajewicz, Malgosia, 2011. "Joint liability versus individual liability in credit contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 107-123, February.
    8. Abdul Karim, Zulkefly, 2009. "Microfinance and Mechanism Design: The Role of Joint Liability and Cross-Reporting," MPRA Paper 23934, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 12 Jan 2010.
    9. Casey B. Mulligan, 2011. "The Expanding Social Safety Net," NBER Working Papers 17654, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Hameem Raees Chowdhury, 2016. "Joint-Liability in Microcredit: Evidence from Bangladesh," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 44(1), pages 105-129, March.
    11. Daripa, Arup, 2008. "Optimal collective contract without peer information or peer monitoring," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 147-163, April.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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