IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/glenvp/v7y2007i1p45-68.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Special Relationship: Chairpersons and the Secretariat in the Climate Change Negotiations

Author

Listed:
  • Joanna Depledge

Abstract

There is growing recognition in the literature of the important roles played by Chairpersons and secretariats in global environmental negotiations. Less frequently recognized, however, is the interdependence of those roles. Using the example of the climate change negotiations, this paper argues that Chairpersons and the secretariat are locked into a mutually-dependent relationship. Whereas the Chairperson has the political authority needed to exert leadership in the negotiations, the secretariat possesses intellectual resources that can maximize the effectiveness of that leadership. The secretariat's input to the negotiations, however, must be shielded by a "veil of legitimacy," whereby the Chairperson takes responsibility for that input. The paper explores how Chairpersons and the secretariat work together, along with the dysfunctionalities that can emerge in this very personal relationship. In doing so, the paper expands our understanding of exactly how these two actors exert influence in global environmental negotiations. (c) 2007 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Suggested Citation

  • Joanna Depledge, 2007. "A Special Relationship: Chairpersons and the Secretariat in the Climate Change Negotiations," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 7(1), pages 45-68, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:tpr:glenvp:v:7:y:2007:i:1:p:45-68
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/glep.2007.7.1.45
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Arild Underdal, 2012. "Strategies in international regime negotiations: reflecting background conditions or shaping outcomes?," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 129-144, May.
    2. Thomas Hickmann & Joshua Philipp Elsässer, 0. "New alliances in global environmental governance: how intergovernmental treaty secretariats interact with non-state actors to address transboundary environmental problems," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-23.
    3. Thomas Hickmann & Joshua Philipp Elsässer, 2020. "New alliances in global environmental governance: how intergovernmental treaty secretariats interact with non-state actors to address transboundary environmental problems," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 459-481, September.
    4. Barbara Saerbeck & Mareike Well & Helge Jörgens & Alexandra Goritz & Nina Kolleck, 2020. "Brokering Climate Action: The UNFCCC Secretariat Between Parties and Nonparty Stakeholders," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 20(2), pages 105-127, May.
    5. Monheim, Kai, 2016. "The ‘power of process:’ how negotiation management influences multilateral cooperation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67921, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Michael W. Manulak, 2017. "Leading by design: Informal influence and international secretariats," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 497-522, December.
    7. Katharina Michaelowa & Axel Michaelowa, 2017. "The growing influence of the UNFCCC Secretariat on the clean development mechanism," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 247-269, April.
    8. Linda Mederake & Barbara Saerbeck & Alexandra Goritz & Helge Jörgens & Mareike Well & Nina Kolleck, 2022. "Cultivated ties and strategic communication: do international environmental secretariats tailor information to increase their bureaucratic reputation?," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 481-506, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tpr:glenvp:v:7:y:2007:i:1:p:45-68. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kelly McDougall (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://direct.mit.edu/journals .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.