IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/asiaec/v11y2012i1p160-176.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Delays in Multilateral Trade Negotiations: An Experimental Study

Author

Listed:
  • Hankyoung Sung

    (Department of Commerce and Finance, Kookmin University)

Abstract

This paper aims to derive policy implications for real trade negotiations from experiments on multilateral legislative bargaining games. The experiment results reveal that the existence of a strong player with veto power could delay the games. Considering the similarity between the games with the veto player and multilateral trade negotiations such as the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), this paper argues that strong countries such as the G-4 (the United States, the European Community, Brazil, and India) may cause delays in the negotiations. Based on experimental findings, this paper suggests group negotiations as a policy option for the DDA. © 2012 The Earth Institute at Columbia University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Suggested Citation

  • Hankyoung Sung, 2012. "Delays in Multilateral Trade Negotiations: An Experimental Study," Asian Economic Papers, MIT Press, vol. 11(1), pages 160-176, Winter/Sp.
    • Handle: RePEc:tpr:asiaec:v:11:y:2012:i:1:p:160-176
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ASEP_a_00131
    File Function: link to full text PDF
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    veto; trade negotiations; delay; Doha Development Agenda;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tpr:asiaec:v:11:y:2012:i:1:p:160-176. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kelly McDougall (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://direct.mit.edu/journals .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.