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Determinants of Urban Land Supply in the People's Republic of China: How Do Political Factors Matter?

Author

Listed:
  • Wen-Tai Hsu

    (School of Economics, Singapore Management University)

  • Xiaolu Li

    (Institute of Urban Development, Nanjing Audit University)

  • Yang Tang

    (Division of Economics, Nanyang Technological University)

  • Jing Wu

    (Hang Lung Center for Real Estate and Department of Construction Management, Tsinghua University)

Abstract

This paper explores whether and how corruption and competition-for-promotion motives affect urban land supply in the People's Republic of China. Conditional on demand-side factors, we find that corruption is highly correlated with an increase in land supply. The corruption effects are strongest for commercial land, followed by residential land, and then industrial land. To shed light on the competition motives among prefectural leaders, we examine how the number of years in office affects land supply and distinguish among different hypotheses. Our empirical results show robust rising trends in land sales. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that among prefectural leaders the impatience and anxiety in later years from not being promoted may contribute to an increase in land sales revenue in later years. We also find that prefectural leaders may aim for more land sales revenue over their first few years in office instead of seeking higher revenue in their first 1–2 years.

Suggested Citation

  • Wen-Tai Hsu & Xiaolu Li & Yang Tang & Jing Wu, 2017. "Determinants of Urban Land Supply in the People's Republic of China: How Do Political Factors Matter?," Asian Development Review, MIT Press, vol. 34(2), pages 152-183, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:tpr:adbadr:v:34:y:2017:i:2:p:152-183
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Yang Shen & Jing Wu & Shuping Wu, 2022. "City‐chief turnover and place‐based policy change: Evidence from China," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(5), pages 1296-1328, November.
    2. Charles Ka Yui Leung & Joe Cho Yiu Ng, 2018. "Macro Aspects of Housing," GRU Working Paper Series GRU_2018_016, City University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics and Finance, Global Research Unit.
    3. Harald Hau & Difei Ouyang, 2019. "Local Capital Scarcity and Small Firm Growth: Evidence from Real Estate Booms in China," CESifo Working Paper Series 7928, CESifo.
    4. Chunping Liu & Zhirong Ou, 2021. "What determines China's housing price dynamics? New evidence from a DSGE‐VAR," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(3), pages 3269-3305, July.
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    6. Gyourko, Joseph & Shen, Yang & Wu, Jing & Zhang, Rongjie, 2022. "Land finance in China: Analysis and review," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    7. Hsu, Wen-Tai & Ma, Lin, 2021. "Urbanization policy and economic development: A quantitative analysis of China's differential hukou reforms," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    institution; land supply; monocentric-city model; People's Republic of China; political factors;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O18 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
    • P25 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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