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Games with information constraints: seeds and spillovers

Author

Listed:
  • Galperti, Simone

    (Department of Economics, University California, San Diego)

  • Perego, Jacopo

    (Department of Economics, Columbia University)

Abstract

We study equilibrium behavior in incomplete-information games under two information constraints: seeds and spillovers. The former restricts which agents can initially receive information. The latter specifies how this information spills over to other agents. Our main result characterizes the equilibrium outcomes under these constraints, without making additional assumptions about the agents' initial information. This involves deriving a “revelation-principle” result for settings in which a mediator cannot communicate directly or privately with the agents. Our model identifies which spillovers are more restrictive and which seeds are more influential. We apply our results to a problem of optimal organization design.

Suggested Citation

  • Galperti, Simone & Perego, Jacopo, 0. "Games with information constraints: seeds and spillovers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:5805
    as

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information; spillovers; seeding; networks; correlated equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • M3 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising

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