IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/usppxx/v11y2024i1p2358887.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Legislative Cooperation and Selective Benefits: An Experimental Investigation on the Limits of Credit Claiming

Author

Listed:
  • Doug Murdoch

Abstract

Do legislators get credit for working with the other party? Studies on this have been limited due to a lack of an appropriate counterfactual. This article experimentally estimates the value of credit claiming on a small project that was produced with bipartisanship or with an uncooperative party. I argue that process does indeed matter. Specifically, I hypothesize voters will punish in-party partisans for working with the other side and punish out-party partisans when they do not work with their side. However, in-party partisans do not care whether their party works with the other side. Out-party partisans punish members for uncooperative legislating. Further, I argue and find that these effects are distinguishable from overall partisan effects, demonstrating that members can use distributional projects to gain out-party support in a polarized environment. These findings have important implications for lawmaking and polarization.

Suggested Citation

  • Doug Murdoch, 2024. "Legislative Cooperation and Selective Benefits: An Experimental Investigation on the Limits of Credit Claiming," Statistics and Public Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(1), pages 2358887-235, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:usppxx:v:11:y:2024:i:1:p:2358887
    DOI: 10.1080/2330443X.2024.2358887
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/2330443X.2024.2358887
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/2330443X.2024.2358887?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:usppxx:v:11:y:2024:i:1:p:2358887. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/uspp .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.