Coordinating two-period ordering and advertising policies in a dynamic market with stochastic demand

In this paper, we study the optimal two-stage advertising and ordering policies and the channel coordination issues in a supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. The manufacturer sells a short-life-cycle product through the retailer facing stochastic demand in dynamic markets characterised by price declines and product obsolescence. Following a two-period newsvendor framework, we develop two members’ optimal ordering and advertising models under both the centralised and decentralised settings, and present the closed-form solutions to the developed models as well. Moreover, we design a two-period revenue-sharing contract, and develop sufficient conditions such that the channel coordination can be achieved and a win–win outcome can be guaranteed. Our analysis suggests that the centralised decision creates an incentive for the retailer to increase the advertising investments in two periods and put the purchase forward, but the decentralised decision mechanism forces the retailer to decrease the advertising investments in two periods and postpone/reduce its purchase in the first period. This phenomenon becomes more evident when demand variability is high.