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Transport Construction, Corruption and Developing Countries

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  • Charles Kenny

Abstract

The construction industry is consistently ranked as one of the most corrupt industries worldwide. The impact of corruption goes beyond bribe payments to poor‐quality construction of transport infrastructure with low‐economic returns alongside low funding for maintenance. Regulation of the construction sector is necessary, but simplicity, transparency, enforcement and a focus on the outcomes of poor construction are likely to have the largest impact. Where government is the client, attempts to counter corruption need to begin at the level of planning and budgeting. Output‐based and community‐driven approaches show some promise as tools to reduce corruption, they will need to be complemented by a range of other interventions including publication of procurement documents, independent and community oversight, physical audit and public--private anti‐corruption partnerships.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles Kenny, 2008. "Transport Construction, Corruption and Developing Countries," Transport Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(1), pages 21-41, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:transr:v:29:y:2008:i:1:p:21-41
    DOI: 10.1080/01441640802075760
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David Croix & Clara Delavallade, 2009. "Growth, public investment and corruption with failing institutions," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 187-219, July.
    2. Nauro Campos & Francesco Giovannoni, 2007. "Lobbying, corruption and political influence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 1-21, April.
    3. Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "The Regulation of Entry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(1), pages 1-37.
    4. Calvo, C.M., 1998. "Options for Managing and Financing Rural Transport Infrastructure," Papers 411, World Bank - Technical Papers.
    5. Brian Levy, 2007. "Governance Reform : Bridging Monitoring and Action," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 6742.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kenny, Charles, 2009. "Why do people die in earthquakes ? the costs, benefits and institutions of disaster risk reduction in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4823, The World Bank.
    2. Andrew R. Goetz, 2011. "The Global Economic Crisis, Investment in Transport Infrastructure, and Economic Development," Chapters, in: Kenneth Button & Aura Reggiani (ed.), Transportation and Economic Development Challenges, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Antonio Estache, 2014. "Infrastructure and Corruption: a Brief Survey," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2014-37, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

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