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Toward efficient waste electric vehicle battery recycling via auction-based market trading mechanisms

Author

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  • Su Xiu Xu
  • Jianghong Feng
  • George Q. Huang
  • Yue Zhai
  • Meng Cheng

Abstract

This paper proposes an auction-based market trade mechanism for the electric vehicle battery recycling (EVBR) problem, which aims to realise the optimal resource allocation and pricing of EVBR. The main motivation of this paper is to attempt to explore an approach to achieving efficient battery recycling. We first consider an EVBR market with m buyers and n sellers, and develop the multi-unit trade reduction (MTR) mechanism in the EVBR market. According to the supply and demand relationship in the EVBR market, we consider three market scenarios of supply and demand balance, oversupply, and overdemand, and formulated corresponding auction allocation rules. Numerical study results show that the proposed MTR mechanism can achieve efficient resource allocation. We also observed that not all results increased with the number of sellers/buyers. Second, considering the distance between sellers and buyers, we developed a stochastic multiple MTR (SM-MTR) mechanism to enable sellers and buyers within the region to conduct transactions. Finally, we propose an integrated MTR, SM-MTR and one-sided Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction mechanism that is feasible in both one-sided and bilateral environments. Furthermore, our work can provide novel managerial implications for EVBR market stakeholders in terms of practical application.

Suggested Citation

  • Su Xiu Xu & Jianghong Feng & George Q. Huang & Yue Zhai & Meng Cheng, 2023. "Toward efficient waste electric vehicle battery recycling via auction-based market trading mechanisms," International Journal of Production Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 61(24), pages 8598-8617, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:tprsxx:v:61:y:2023:i:24:p:8598-8617
    DOI: 10.1080/00207543.2022.2157904
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    Cited by:

    1. Xu, Su Xiu & Guo, Ren-Yong & Zhai, Yue & Feng, Jianghong & Ning, Yu, 2024. "Toward a positive compensation policy for rail transport via mechanism design: The case of China Railway Express," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 322-342.

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