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Short- and long-term repeated game behaviours of two parallel supply chains based on government subsidy in the vehicle market

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  • Binshuo Bao
  • Junhai Ma
  • Mark Goh

Abstract

In response to environmental protection policies issued by the United Nations Environment Program, battery electric vehicles (BEVs) have been developed. This paper studies the short- and long-term repeated game behaviours of two parallel supply chains involving duopoly vehicle manufacturers producing BEVs and fuel vehicles (FVs). Taking consumers’ low-carbon preference and government subsidy scheme into account, optimal decisions and comparative analyses under the three game strategies of non-cooperative game and cooperative game and cost-sharing contract under supply chain coordination have been conducted. In the short-term game supply chain, three game models (non-cooperative, cooperative and cost-sharing contract) are formulated and three optimal decisions are compared. In the long-term repeated game supply chain, the dynamic behaviours of two parallel supply chains under non-cooperative game are analysed. We uncovered that the prices of BEVs are more dependent on the reduction of carbon emissions and government subsidy than FVs. In addition to supply chain coordination, consumers’ low-carbon preference also improves the total profits of the three game models. Furthermore, the adjustment speed of the eco-friendly level of BEVs has the most significant impact on the vehicle market.

Suggested Citation

  • Binshuo Bao & Junhai Ma & Mark Goh, 2020. "Short- and long-term repeated game behaviours of two parallel supply chains based on government subsidy in the vehicle market," International Journal of Production Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 58(24), pages 7507-7530, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:tprsxx:v:58:y:2020:i:24:p:7507-7530
    DOI: 10.1080/00207543.2020.1711988
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    Cited by:

    1. Li, Kunpeng & Wang, Lan, 2023. "Optimal electric vehicle subsidy and pricing decisions with consideration of EV anxiety and EV preference in green and non-green consumers," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 170(C).
    2. Ma, Junhai & Tian, Yi & Xu, Tiantong & Koivumäki, Timo & Xu, Yueqiang, 2022. "Dynamic game study of multi-channel supply chain under cap-and-trade regulation," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    3. Yu, Yi & Zhou, Dequn & Zha, Donglan & Wang, Qunwei & Zhu, Qingyuan, 2021. "Optimal production and pricing strategies in auto supply chain when dual credit policy is substituted for subsidy policy," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
    4. Qiuyun Zhu & Xiaoyang Zhou & Aijun Liu & Chong Gao & Lei Xu & Fan Zhao & Ding Zhang & Benjamin Lev, 2022. "Equilibrium Optimization with Multi-Energy-Efficiency-Grade Products: Government and Market Perspective," Energies, MDPI, vol. 15(19), pages 1-23, October.
    5. Ma, Junhai & Hou, Yaming & Wang, Zongxian & Yang, Wenhui, 2021. "Pricing strategy and coordination of automobile manufacturers based on government intervention and carbon emission reduction," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 148(PA).
    6. Xiaogang Ma & Chunyu Bao & Jizi Li & Wandong Lou, 2022. "The impact of dual fairness concerns on bargaining game and its dynamic system stability," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 318(1), pages 357-382, November.
    7. Zhao, Meng & Li, Bin & Ren, Jiali & Hao, Zhihua, 2023. "Competition equilibrium of ride-sourcing platforms and optimal government subsidies considering customers’ green preference under peak carbon dioxide emissions," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 255(C).
    8. Huang, Xingyu & Zheng, Pengjun & Liu, Guiyun, 2024. "Non-cooperative and Nash-bargaining game of a two-parallel maritime supply chain considering government subsidy and forwarder's CSR strategy: A dynamic perspective," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).

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