The impact of contract parameters on the supply chain performance under different power constellations

Reporting forecast data is a common method used to improve the functioning of supply chains (SCs) and to reduce supply shortages. Customers tend to report the maximum possible demand as a forecast if restrictions are missing. Such a forecast is useless for suppliers. Hence, special contracts are needed to enhance the value of forecast data and therefore the cooperation between SC partners. In this paper, such a contract is presented. It encourages the customer to report a more realistic forecast. Deviations from the reported forecast are punished in different ways: If the customer reported too much and wants to release less than what was reported, he has to pay a penalty. On the other hand, the customer has the flexibility to purchase more than reported to meet the demand on his outlet but at the cost of an additional fee. This paper analyses how different contract parameters affect the performance of the SC, in particular when the bargaining power of customer and supplier is not equally distributed. Results show that the supplier and therefore the SC is better off if the supplier leaves the contractual cost parameters untouched but hides the true value of flexibility, especially when the customer is less powerful than the supplier.