Strategically decentralise when encroaching on a dominant supplier

A manufacturer may encroach on his suppliers by developing substitutable components. In the presence of encroachment, the manufacturer could assemble products using (high-end) components purchased from the supplier, and assemble products using (low-end) components produced in-house. Thus, the manufacturer must deliberate on how to manage the expanded organisation consisting of competing product divisions. In this paper, we examine the quintessential organisational structure decision -- the centralisation versus decentralisation choice -- from the perspective of the manufacturer. Our model assumes that the supplier is a dominant player, moving first by pricing the high-end component, and consumers have a higher willingness-to-pay of the product containing the high-end component. In such a context, we find that the manufacturer may encroach on the supplier even if producing the low-end component costs more than producing the high-end one. The supplier should strategically price to deter or accommodate downstream encroachment contingent on the manufacturer’s organisational structure decision. If the unit cost of low-end components is high enough, product-based decentralisation is preferred to centralisation due to the supplier’s lower wholesale price. Furthermore, the manufacturer’s strategic decentralisation always hurts the supplier, always benefits the customers and could benefit or hurt the entire supply chain under certain conditions.