IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/tjorxx/v70y2019i12p2084-2096.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Dynamic incentive model of knowledge sharing in construction project team based on differential game

Author

Listed:
  • Lingna Lin
  • He Wang

Abstract

The construction project team is a demanding, high-stress environment, yet wary participants can be extremely difficult in sharing their knowledge with others. This is a study that targets dynamic knowledge sharing in a construction project team, constructing a dynamic incentive model framework. It is done through the differential game theory, and the application of the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation is introduced to solve a Nash non-cooperative game and Leader-follower differential games. The results show that the optimal strategy of the Nash game is that agents do not share any knowledge and the principal does not give any incentives. However, the participants will share the cumulative amount of knowledge in the Leader-follower differential games, and the optimal profits of agents and principal are increased as time progressed, and the agents’ effort level of knowledge sharing eventually tending to stability.

Suggested Citation

  • Lingna Lin & He Wang, 2019. "Dynamic incentive model of knowledge sharing in construction project team based on differential game," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 70(12), pages 2084-2096, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:tjorxx:v:70:y:2019:i:12:p:2084-2096
    DOI: 10.1080/01605682.2018.1516177
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/01605682.2018.1516177
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/01605682.2018.1516177?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Wei Peng & Baogui Xin & Yekyung Kwon, 2019. "Optimal Strategies of Product Price, Quality, and Corporate Environmental Responsibility," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 16(23), pages 1-24, November.
    2. JeongWook Son, 2022. "Complexity and Dynamics in Construction Project Organizations," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(20), pages 1-20, October.
    3. Xiaodan Kong & Qi Xu & Tao Zhu, 2019. "Dynamic Evolution of Knowledge Sharing Behavior among Enterprises in the Cluster Innovation Network Based on Evolutionary Game Theory," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-23, December.
    4. Ceric Anita & Ivic Ivona, 2021. "Network analysis of interconnections between theoretical concepts associated with principal–agent theory concerning construction projects," Organization, Technology and Management in Construction, Sciendo, vol. 13(2), pages 2450-2464, January.
    5. Fan Zhang & Zhe Huang & Li Dong, 2024. "A differential game model based on the government subsidy strategy considering the green pharmaceutical problem and the goodwill of the company," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 26(10), pages 25281-25309, October.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:tjorxx:v:70:y:2019:i:12:p:2084-2096. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/tjor .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.