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The choice of multiple or single auctions in emissions trading

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  • Svante Mandell

Abstract

Whether CO 2 permit auctions should be held on one, several or many occasions per commitment period has not been discussed at any length in the literature. When at all observed, auction frequency has often been set at once per month or quarter. Here, it is argued that for reasons of efficiency, it is generally best to have just one single auction per commitment period. The arguments given relate to the role played by such factors as emission trading design, auction design, market power, transaction costs and, in particular, 'the winner's curse'.

Suggested Citation

  • Svante Mandell, 2005. "The choice of multiple or single auctions in emissions trading," Climate Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(1), pages 97-107, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:tcpoxx:v:5:y:2005:i:1:p:97-107
    DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2005.9685543
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bohm, Peter, 2002. "Comparing Permit Allocation Options: The Main Points," Research Papers in Economics 2002:11, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
    2. Lawrence M. Ausubel, 2002. "Implications of Auction Theory for New Issues Markets," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 02-19, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
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    Cited by:

    1. Federico Boffa & Stefano Clò & Alessio D'Amato, 2013. "Environmental policy and incentives to adopt abatement technologies under endogenous uncertainty," Working Papers 5, Department of the Treasury, Ministry of the Economy and of Finance.
    2. Tang, Ling & Wu, Jiaqian & Yu, Lean & Bao, Qin, 2017. "Carbon allowance auction design of China's emissions trading scheme: A multi-agent-based approach," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 30-40.
    3. Cong, Rong-Gang & Wei, Yi-Ming, 2010. "Auction design for the allocation of carbon emission allowances: uniform or discriminatory price?," MPRA Paper 112210, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Simone Borghesi & Massimiliano Montini, 2015. "The allocation of carbon emission permits; theoretical aspects and practical problems in the EU ETS," Working papers wpaper75, Financialisation, Economy, Society & Sustainable Development (FESSUD) Project.

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