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Market discipline and regulatory authority oversight of banks: Complements not substitutes

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  • Paul Hamalainen

Abstract

As academic and practitioner research increasingly questions the role and effectiveness of rules-based bank regulatory oversight, in favour of incentive-compatible regulatory design, so the question is raised: what is the appropriate structure for future regulatory design? Through a discussion of the social benefits and costs of introducing incentive-based solutions in bank regulatory design and a review of the empirical evidence, this paper aims to explain why a mixed regulatory approach, consisting of both the regulatory authorities and market-based oversight, and founded on rules and incentives, may be the only solution for efficient and effective regulation. In so doing, the paper confirms the need to create rules that encourage incentive compatible behaviour by all bank stakeholders. It is argued that these rules are compatible with the primary objective of bank regulation, i.e. maintaining systemic stability. With the aid of Hamalainen et al.'s [2004] framework for effective market discipline, the paper also analyses to what extent market-based solutions, in the form of market discipline, can be credibly incorporated into bank regulatory design. As such the paper illustrates how prescriptive rules and the regulatory approach of monitoring that it fosters would still be an essential component of bank regulatory design. Furthermore, this analysis results in a structure for conducting future empirical research on the effectiveness of market discipline.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Hamalainen, 2006. "Market discipline and regulatory authority oversight of banks: Complements not substitutes," The Service Industries Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(1), pages 97-117, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:servic:v:26:y:2006:i:1:p:97-117
    DOI: 10.1080/02642060500358902
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Delianedis, Gordon & Geske, Robert, 2001. "The Components of Corporate Credit Spreads: Default, Recovery, Tax, Jumps, Liquidity, and Market Factors," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management qt32x284q3, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA.
    2. Rahul Dhumale, 2000. "An Incentive Based Regulatory System: A Bridge Too Far," Working Papers wp170, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    3. Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, 2000. "Reforming Bank Capital Regulation: A Proposal by the U.S. Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 920273, September.
    4. Maximilian J.B. Hall (ed.), 2001. "The Regulation and Supervision of Banks," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, volume 0, number 1797.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marília Pinheiro Ohlson & Gerlando Augusto Sampaio Franco de Lima & Tony Takeda, 2021. "Deposit insurance and brokerage firms: impacts on the market discipline of the Brazilian banking industry," Working Papers Series 542, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
    2. Godspower-Akpomiemie, Euphemia & Ojah, Kalu, 2021. "Market discipline, regulation and banking effectiveness: Do measures matter?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).

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