Reconciling economics with naturalist ethical theory

The exclusive use of evolutionary explanations and game theory to justify moral claims has led economists to an impasse. Our discussion of this problem is focused on arguments made by Kenneth Binmore and Herbert Gintis, two vocal and notable economists behind these efforts. We begin by pointing out the false dilemma they present between ethical theories involving dubious non-naturalist metaphysics and their versions of naturalized game-theoretic ethics. We do so by, first, discussing alternative naturalist accounts, namely, those of Peter Railton and Richard Boyd. Second, we argue that their descriptive and explanatory theories are in fact committed to substantive normative claims. Our hypothesis is that their attempts to avoid ethical arguments are responsible for their mistaken belief that theirs is a scientific disagreement, whereas it is in fact one about human nature. Binmore and Gintis’s disagreement about ethical claims requires acknowledging and engaging with substantive normative arguments such as those of what is good and what ought to be done. The alternative would be a never-ending disagreement on the fundamental view of human nature. This path, we worry, may be a road to nowhere.