Accountants, Europeanists and Monetary Guardians: bureaucratic cultures and conflicts in IMF-EU lending programs

When the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund provided financial assistance to crisis-ridden European countries, they frequently clashed over loan conditions related to financial stability, fiscal policy and structural adjustment. This is puzzling given that the three organizations shared a general understanding of how to resolve the crisis, its causes and the need for austerity and were supervised by the same major stakeholders. We argue that these conflicting approaches to financial assistance are the result of distinct bureaucratic cultures. Drawing on empirical evidence from the loan programs to Ireland and Greece we show that preferences voiced by Troika institutions were consistent across countries and reflected coherent approaches to credit lending. The Fund played the role of an ‘Accountant’, seeking to ensure that ‘the numbers add up’ so that its loans are repaid on schedule. The Commission acted as an ‘Europeanist’, interpreting the compatibility of conditions with European rules and treaties as a way to regain competitiveness. The European Central Bank, as the ‘Monetary Guardian’ of the Troika, focused on securing financial and monetary stability for the Eurozone as a whole.