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The political motivations of the United States’ bilateral investment treaty program

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  • Adam S. Chilton

Abstract

The United States has signed 47 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) over the last three decades. The standard explanation for why the United States’ government signed those BITs is that it was motivated by a desire to promote the development of international investment law and to protect American capital invested abroad. An alternative explanation, however, is that the United States has largely used BITs as a foreign policy tool to improve relationships with strategically important countries in the developing world. This project uses qualitative and quantitative evidence to assess whether the United States was motivated to sign BITs based on investment considerations or political considerations. The qualitative evidence suggests that US executive branch officials viewed BITs as a potential way to cement and strengthen relationships with politically important countries. The quantitative evidence suggests that proxies for investment considerations – like trade and FDI flows – are weak predictors of US BIT formation, but that political considerations – like military aid and whether a country was formerly a communist state – are consistently statistically significant predictors. Taken together, the evidence supports the argument that political considerations are better predictors of the BITs the United States signed than investment considerations.

Suggested Citation

  • Adam S. Chilton, 2016. "The political motivations of the United States’ bilateral investment treaty program," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(4), pages 614-642, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:rripxx:v:23:y:2016:i:4:p:614-642
    DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2016.1200478
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    Cited by:

    1. Tarald Gulseth Berge & Øyvind Stiansen, 2023. "Bureaucratic capacity and preference attainment in international economic negotiations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 467-498, July.
    2. Bhagwat, Vineet & Brogaard, Jonathan & Julio, Brandon, 2021. "A BIT goes a long way: Bilateral investment treaties and cross-border mergers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(2), pages 514-538.
    3. Seungjun Kim, 2023. "Protecting home: how firms’ investment plans affect the formation of bilateral investment treaties," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 667-692, October.
    4. Gertz, Geoffrey & Jandhyala, Srividya & Poulsen, Lauge N. Skovgaard, 2018. "Legalization, diplomacy, and development: Do investment treaties de-politicize investment disputes?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 239-252.
    5. Bian, Bo & Meier, Jean-Marie & Xu, Ting, 2021. "Cross-Border Institutions and the Globalization of Innovation," LawFin Working Paper Series 23, Goethe University, Center for Advanced Studies on the Foundations of Law and Finance (LawFin).
    6. Robert Basedow, 2021. "The EU's International Investment Policy ten years on: the Policy‐Making Implications of Unintended Competence Transfers," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 643-660, May.
    7. Basedow, Robert, 2020. "The EU's international investment policy ten years on: the policy-making implications of unintended competence transfers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 105161, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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