IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/rjrhxx/v28y2019i1p129-144.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Bargaining Power and the Choice of Brokerage Contract

Author

Listed:
  • Kimberly R. Goodwin

Abstract

The exclusive right to sell listing contract is believed to be preferable to the exclusive agency listing contract because it gives the listing broker more incentive to put effort into the sale of the home and earn a commission. Researchers have developed theory and reported evidence to support that sellers are worse off by choosing the exclusive agency contract because brokers are going to exert less effort. In this study, I frame the question differently by developing a model based on combined bargaining power rather than broker effort and show how the greater potential bargaining power of the exclusive agency contract can impact the selling price, time on market, and probability of sale.

Suggested Citation

  • Kimberly R. Goodwin, 2019. "Bargaining Power and the Choice of Brokerage Contract," Journal of Housing Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(1), pages 129-144, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:rjrhxx:v:28:y:2019:i:1:p:129-144
    DOI: 10.1080/10835547.2019.12092156
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/10835547.2019.12092156
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/10835547.2019.12092156?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:rjrhxx:v:28:y:2019:i:1:p:129-144. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/rjrh20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.