Electoral contestation, goods provision, and construction of devolved government in Northern Kenya

Upon election in 2013, the first governors of the 47 counties created by Kenya’s 2010 constitution assumed responsibility for the construction – in some cases, especially in the historically marginalized north of the country, essentially from scratch – of the local administrative apparatuses needed to perform devolved government functions and manage county budgets. In this article, I draw on government, news media, and interview data to examine the local electoral drivers of the substantial variation in the new county administrations' capacity and performance. A paired comparison of Turkana and West Pokot counties in Northern Kenya shows that threats to political survival posed by electoral opponents incentivize vertically accountable local leaders to substitute clientelism for state-building. To secure reelection in 2017, the governors of both counties needed to satisfy constituent demands for improved access to state resources. Faced with weak electoral rivals, the Turkana leader did so by extending public service delivery, which required the construction of a capable county government. In contrast, his West Pokot counterpart’s vulnerability to electoral competition prompted reallocation of county resources to clients at the expense of investment in administrative capacity and public goods provision.