Universal basic income, time inconsistency and saving regret

We investigate whether a universal basic income (UBI) programme should replace New Zealand’s public pension system. A UBI programme would increase the number of social benefit recipients and hence increase tax rates. Not only the basic income itself but also its accompanying tax rate hikes would influence intra- and inter-temporal choices of households. We use an overlapping generations model and show that households’ preferences would be time-inconsistent—in hindsight, households regret having saved too little. There are three major findings of this study. First, the public pension system would be preferred to a UBI programme increasing the tax rate of income. Second, a UBI programme increasing the consumption tax rate would be preferred to the public pension system by households at most ages, but they would reverse the preference later in their lives. Third, a decrease in the population growth rate would make the reversal of the preference more noticeable.