Do the government subsidies inhibit the entity over-financialization? Fresh evidence from China

In order to verify effect of the industrial policies on solving the problem of market failure, we collect the data from China A-share listed companies among 2008-2019, and analyze the effect of government subsidies on the entity over-financialization. The results show that government subsidies significantly inhibit the entity over-financialization. Because the government subsidies could increase the performance of enterprise’s main business and level of the enterprise’s profitability. Subsequently, the enterprise’s arbitrage from cross-industries and the managers’ composition could be decreased. Consequently, government subsidies could reduce the entity over-financialization by the reduce of enterprise’s arbitrage from multi-industries and increase of the managers’ composition which is related to the enterprise’s performance. The results also indicate that the entity financialization is mainly motivated by enterprise arbitrage rather than ‘preventive reserve’ in China. Moreover, the inhibitory effect of government subsidies on the entity over-financialization is only significant in the enterprises with non-state-owned, high-tech, and higher level of demand of innovation. Thus, the government should accurately implement subsidy policies for the enterprises and increase the supports for enterprises with high-tech and higher level of demand of innovation, which could promote economy high-quality development.