Author
Abstract
London Authority, consisting of a Mayor and Assembly, is an oddity: it is both a renewal of London city government and a component of the Labour government's devolution reforms which have set out some of the parameters for devolution to the other English regions. The GLA's powers are strategic and were limited by Whitehall resistance to devolution. Mayor and Assembly are supported by a common administration, which has resulted in some frictions. Policy delivery is in the hands of 'functional bodies' and/or the London boroughs and there is much scope for intervention by Whitehall. The GLA budget is modest, though it does have a limited fiscal autonomy in the form of a council tax precept and congestion charging. The GLA is significantly less powerful than devolved institutions in Scotland and Wales; the pattern of Whitehall resistance and a complex institutional environment in London hamper the capacity to bring about even modest change. Further reform is inevitable. La Greater London Authority (l'autorite municipale responsable de l'agglomeration de Londres), qui consiste en un Maire et une Assemblee, est bizarre: elle constitue a la fois une reprise de l'administration de la ville de Londres et partie integrante des reformes du gouvernement travailliste en faveur de la regionalisation qui a formule quelques-uns des parametres pour le transfert du pouvoir aux autres regions d'Angleterre. Les pouvoirs de la GLA sont strategiques et ils ont ete limites par l'opposition de Whitehall a la regionalisation. Le Maire et l'Assemblee sont soutenus par une seule administration, ce qui a ete cause de friction. La mise en oeuvre de la politique est entre les mains des 'organismes fonctionnels' et/ou des municipalites de Londres, et le champ d'intervention de Whitehall s'avere large. Le budget de la GLA est modeste, bien que dote d'une certaine autonomie fiscale quant a la perception des taxes locales et des frais d'encombrement. Les pouvoirs de la GLA sont beaucoup moins importants que ne le sont ceux des institutions regionalisees en Ecosse et aux pays de Galles; l'organisation de l'opposition aWhitehall et un milieu institutionnel complexe a Londres empechent aucun changement. D'autres reformes sont inevitables. Die aus einem Oberburgermeister und einer Versammlung bestehende Verwaltungsbehorde von Grosslondon (Greater London Authority GLA) ist ein Kuriositum: einerseits eine Wiederherstellung der Londoner Stadtverwaltung, andrerseits aber auch Teil der Dezentralisierungsreformen der Labourregierung, die verschiedene Rahmenbestimmungen fur die Dezentralisierung der anderen englischen Regionen aufgestellt hat. Die Befugnisse der Verwaltungsbehorden von Grosslondon sind strategischer Art; Grenzen wurden ihr durch den Widerstand der der Regierung in Whitehall gegen Dezentralisierung gesetzt. Oberburgermeister und Versammlung werden von einem gemeinsamen Verwaltungsapparat unterstutzt, was gelegentlich zu Reibereien gefuhrt hat. Die Ausfuhrung von Bestebungen liegt in Handen von 'Funktionskorperschaften' und/oder den Londoner Stadtbezirken, was Whitehall reichlich Spielraum fur Intervention lasst. Der Etat der GLA ist bescheiden, obwohl sie sich begrenzter finanzieller Autonomie in Form von Erhebung von Stadtsteuern und Gebuhrenzahlung gegen Strassenverstopfung erfreut. Die GLA hat deutlich weniger Machtbefugnisse als dezentralisierte Institutionen in Schottland und Wales; das Zusammenspiel von Widerstand seitens Whitehall und einer komplexen institutionalisierten Umwelt in London behindert die Moglichkeiten, auch nur bescheidene Anderungen durchzusetzen. Weitere Reformen sind unvermeidlich.
Suggested Citation
Tony Travers, 2002.
"Decentralization London-style: The GLA and London Governance,"
Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(7), pages 779-788.
Handle:
RePEc:taf:regstd:v:36:y:2002:i:7:p:779-788
DOI: 10.1080/0034340022000006097
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Cited by:
- Gill Bentley & Lee Pugalis, 2013.
"New directions in economic development: Localist policy discourses and the Localism Act,"
Local Economy, London South Bank University, vol. 28(3), pages 257-274, May.
- Simon Batterbury, 2003.
"Environmental Activism and Social Networks: Campaigning for Bicycles and Alternative Transport in West London,"
The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 590(1), pages 150-169, November.
- Martin Laffin, 2004.
"Is Regional Centralism Inevitable? The Case of the Welsh Assembly,"
Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(2), pages 213-223.
- Mace, Alan & Sitkin, Alan, 2019.
"Planning at the interface of localism and mayoral priorities: London’s ungovernable boroughs,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
101921, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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