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National Electoral Cycles in Transfers to Subnational Jurisdictions. Evidence from Argentina

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  • Cecilia Rumi

Abstract

The political budget cycle literature studies the periodic fluctuations in governments' fiscal policies induced by the cyclicality of electoral processes, but the effects of elections on the distribution of federal resources among subnational governments has not been thoroughly investigated. This paper inquires into the presence of electoral cycles in federal government transfers, presenting evidence on how the Argentine national government has allocated, since the reestablishment of democracy in 1983, two different types of discretional transfers — cash and in-kind — among the subnational governments. There is an electoral manipulation of total transfers that favors subnational governments that are politically affiliated to the national government; cash transfers show that same pattern. However, in-kind transfers, which are more traceable to the national government than cash transfers, increase in non-affiliated subnational jurisdictions during election years.

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  • Cecilia Rumi, 2014. "National Electoral Cycles in Transfers to Subnational Jurisdictions. Evidence from Argentina," Journal of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(1), pages 161-178, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:recsxx:v:17:y:2014:i:1:p:161-178
    DOI: 10.1016/S1514-0326(14)60007-6
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    Cited by:

    1. Guglielmo Barone & Guido de Blasio & Alessio D'Ignazio & Andrea Salvati, 2017. "Incentives to local public service provision: an evaluation of Italy�s Obiettivi di Servizio," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 388, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    2. Jorge L D. Ferreira & Alexandre F. Alves & Emilie Caldeira, 2021. "Grants for Whom and Why? The Politics of Allocation of Transfers in Brazil," The Developing Economies, Institute of Developing Economies, vol. 59(1), pages 39-63, March.
    3. Alessio Mitra & Athanasios Chymis, 2022. "Federalism, but how? The impact of vertical fiscal imbalance on economic growth. Evidence from Belgium," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(2), pages 322-350, July.
    4. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus," Post-Print hal-01291401, HAL.
    5. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 235-259, January.
    6. Pablo Garofalo & Daniel Lema & Jorge M. Streb, 2020. "Political budget cycles and voting within a federal country: The influence of political alignment," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 305-334, July.
    7. Pablo Garofalo & Daniel Lema & Jorge M. Streb, 2016. "Party alignment, political budget cycles and vote within a federal country," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 601, Universidad del CEMA, revised May 2017.
    8. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01291401, HAL.

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