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Sublicense and cartel enforcement mechanism in first price auction

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  • Luigi Di Gaetano

Abstract

In 2017, the Italian Competition Authority opened a cartel investigation regarding the auction of international television sport rights. In particular, prior to several auctions, bidders have agreed to sublicense the audio-visual football rights in a reciprocal way. Without any reference and evaluation on the specific case, this paper aims at showing that a sublicense agreements can modify the outcome of an auction, even in a first price sealed bid version. This is because the sublicense agreement can be used to indirectly implement a “bid submission mechanism” [RC Marshall and LM Marx, ‘Bidder Collusion’ [2007] 133(1) JET 374]. This result strongly supports the idea that such an agreement should be considered as restriction by object under European antitrust law.

Suggested Citation

  • Luigi Di Gaetano, 2019. "Sublicense and cartel enforcement mechanism in first price auction," European Competition Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(1), pages 97-106, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:recjxx:v:15:y:2019:i:1:p:97-106
    DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2019.1592416
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