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Which terminals should expand investment: a perspective of internal non-cooperative competition in a port?

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  • Chuanxu Wang
  • Fengjue Xie
  • Lang Xu

Abstract

With the increasing container cargo throughput and the arising of port congestion, container ports start to choose the investment expansion strategy to increase the port efficiency and then to figure out the problem of port congestion. To analyze this strategy, we formulate a non-cooperative game model for a two-terminals-one-port system, and derive the optimal equilibrium outcomes of the investment expansion strategy and investment constant strategy. In the game, we find that when the investment parameter of expansion strategy and impact of handling efficiency on demand changes, both pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium exist, and two terminals are more likely to choose the investment expansion strategy in most cases. Numerical simulation is applied to explore the equilibrium strategy under different circumstance.

Suggested Citation

  • Chuanxu Wang & Fengjue Xie & Lang Xu, 2020. "Which terminals should expand investment: a perspective of internal non-cooperative competition in a port?," Maritime Policy & Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(6), pages 718-735, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:marpmg:v:47:y:2020:i:6:p:718-735
    DOI: 10.1080/03088839.2020.1725674
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    Cited by:

    1. Xiao, Yi & Wang, Grace & Ge, Ying-En & Xu, Qinyi & Li, Kevin X., 2021. "Game model for a new inspection regime of port state control under different reward and punishment conditions," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).
    2. Liu Jiaguo & Zhang Huimin & Zhao Huida, 2021. "Blockchain Technology Investment and Sharing Strategy of Port Supply Chain Under Competitive Environment," Journal of Systems Science and Information, De Gruyter, vol. 9(3), pages 280-309, June.

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