Shipbuilding disputes: the WTO panel rulings and the elimination of operating subsidy from shipbuilding

This paper sets out the developments in world shipbuilding policy that have occurred in the past decade. It reviews and outlines the situation that existed in the late 1990s, when an Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) agreement on the elimination of shipyard operating subsidies was tantalisingly close. After the Introduction, the second section provides a brief review of the development of the industry over the past three decades, setting the context for developments since 1997. The third section discusses the complaint of the European Union (EU) to the World Trade Organization (WTO) concerning the Republic of Korea's support for its shipbuilding sector, and its counterclaim over the EU's temporary defence mechanism (TDM). It is argued that the core of the EU's case at the WTO was flawed, and that the reintroduction of an operating subsidy via the TDM was a mistake. The only prospect for regularizing competition in this area lies in the negotiation of the OECD agreement that was completed, but not ratified, in 1994. Given the souring of relations between two of the main players in this area, the prospects for such a settlement seem remote. The fourth section uses Olson's theory of groups to argue that the European Commission's actions were driven primarily by industry pressure groups, and failed to consider the potential views of other European stakeholders, in particular the taxpayers. Given the failure of the EU's action at the WTO, the future direction of European shipbuilding policy will have to focus on strategies for internal development and improved industrial competitiveness.