Administrative Discretion Through Changing Presidencies and Political Polarization: Reflection on the Rise, Fall, and Rise of Federal-Local Immigration Partnerships in the U.S

Created by Congress in 1996, the immigration enforcement program 287(g) has experienced several cycles of rapid expansion and contraction during different stages in the policy’s relatively brief lifetime. It is an intergovernmental program where state and local agencies sign onto agreements with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), effectively deputizing law enforcement agents to implement federal immigration policy. Using logit models and the lens of bureaucratic discretion, we find that agencies in politically conservative jurisdictions and counties with proportionally large Hispanic populations were most likely to sign these agreements and maintain them during the program’s lean years. Conservative counties were even more likely to have them when they have larger Hispanic populations and during times of Republican presidential administrations. This paper puts these findings in comparative perspective and links them to the worldwide trend of democratic decline and the rise of right-wing populism in Europe and elsewhere.