IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/lpadxx/v41y2018i14p1157-1168.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Organizational Forms and Incentives in Public Procurement: Natural Experiment at a Large Public Sector Organization in Russia

Author

Listed:
  • Andrey Tkachenko
  • Andrei Yakovlev
  • Yuliya Rodionova

Abstract

This article analyses how the intensification of centralized monitoring within public organization may impact incentives for efficiency in those divisions of the organization that have different levels of financial autonomy. The efficiency of divisions’ activities was estimated through their procurement effectiveness. All the divisions were classified as non-commercial units (NCU) funded by the government or as income earning units (IEU) operating in the market and having broader financial autonomy. The results show that under standard monitoring, the IEU had more efficient procurements compared to the NCU. After intensification of centralized monitoring, the differences in performance became insignificant. These findings show that stricter monitoring is efficient for organizations with soft budget constraints, while for organizations with hard budget constraints it is preferable to use more flexible regulations.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrey Tkachenko & Andrei Yakovlev & Yuliya Rodionova, 2018. "Organizational Forms and Incentives in Public Procurement: Natural Experiment at a Large Public Sector Organization in Russia," International Journal of Public Administration, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(14), pages 1157-1168, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:lpadxx:v:41:y:2018:i:14:p:1157-1168
    DOI: 10.1080/01900692.2017.1350191
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/01900692.2017.1350191
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/01900692.2017.1350191?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:lpadxx:v:41:y:2018:i:14:p:1157-1168. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/lpad .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.