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Cooperation versus Free Riding in a Threshold Public Goods Classroom Experiment

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  • Melanie Marks
  • David Lehr
  • Ray Brastow

Abstract

Abstract: The authors present a classroom public goods experiment on the basis of a provision-point mechanism (PPM), where subjects must make an all or nothing decision about providing the public good. As a teaching tool, this design is superior to traditional prisoner's dilemma games because it creates multiple equilibrium in which individual financial incentive to contribute less may result in a coordination failure. Because the PPM does not incorporate a dominant strategy to free ride, students must individually choose a level of cooperation without the benefits of communication. Students discover problems of achieving an optimal social outcome because failure to coordinate on an efficient equilibrium can eliminate benefits to the group. This experiment is an excellent vehicle for introducing game theoretic problems of public good provision and for engendering meaningful discussion of real-world applications.

Suggested Citation

  • Melanie Marks & David Lehr & Ray Brastow, 2006. "Cooperation versus Free Riding in a Threshold Public Goods Classroom Experiment," The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(2), pages 156-170, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:jeduce:v:37:y:2006:i:2:p:156-170
    DOI: 10.3200/JECE.37.2.156-170
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    Cited by:

    1. Metin TETİK, 2020. "Investigating factors affecting cooperative and non-cooperative behavior: An experimental game in the classroom," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania / Editura Economica, vol. 0(2(623), S), pages 205-214, Summer.
    2. Andreas Park, 2010. "Experiential Learning of the Efficient Market Hypothesis: Two Trading Games," The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(4), pages 353-369, September.
    3. Kandul, Serhiy & Lanz, Bruno, 2021. "Public good provision, in-group cooperation and out-group descriptive norms: A lab experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    4. Claudia Niemeyer & Timm Teubner & Margeret Hall & Christof Weinhardt, 2018. "The Impact of Dynamic Feedback and Personal Budgets on Arousal and Funding Behaviour in Participatory Budgeting," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 611-636, August.

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