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Paternalism for rational agents

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  • Kevin Leportier

Abstract

In the context of strategic interactions, individuals sometimes find themselves better off when they have fewer options. This mechanism is known under the name of ‘strategic commitment’, as it is usually the individuals themselves who ‘commit’ to following a certain course of action by restricting their options; but that is not necessary. I explain how a paternalistic intervention may be conceived where it is a third party who paternalistically restricts rational individuals’ choices to improve their welfare. This kind of intervention, which I call ‘strategic paternalism’, contradicts the narrative according to which welfare economics is incompatible with paternalism because it assumes individual rationality, which would make paternalism irrelevant. To prove this point, I show why and in what sense this ‘strategic paternalism’ deserves to be called that way.

Suggested Citation

  • Kevin Leportier, 2024. "Paternalism for rational agents," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(2), pages 78-90, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:jecmet:v:31:y:2024:i:2:p:78-90
    DOI: 10.1080/1350178X.2024.2346116
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