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Negotiating Informality– Ambiguity, Intermediation, and a Patchwork of Outcomes in Slums of Bengaluru

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  • Anirudh Krishna
  • Emily Rains
  • Erik Wibbels

Abstract

In developing countries, procedural ambiguity due to bureaucratic overlap and political discretion gives rise to divergence between law and practice. In this context of pervasive informality, it is important to consider how local negotiations produce disparate outcomes. We examine these local negotiations to explain how informal property rights are acquired and how markets operate in the slums of Bengaluru, India. Drawing on original interview and survey data, we describe how at least 18 types of property documents issued to urban slum residents can be ordered along a tenure continuum. Intermediaries are required to negotiate the opportunities that lie hidden within ambiguity. A first set of political intermediaries helps slum residents acquire property rights incrementally along this continuum. A second set of intermediaries helps facilitate informal housing transactions, keeping markets liquid across the tenure continuum. The mechanics of acquiring and transacting informal properties can differ across cities and countries, but, across contexts, intermediation helps negotiate informality.

Suggested Citation

  • Anirudh Krishna & Emily Rains & Erik Wibbels, 2020. "Negotiating Informality– Ambiguity, Intermediation, and a Patchwork of Outcomes in Slums of Bengaluru," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 56(11), pages 1983-1999, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:jdevst:v:56:y:2020:i:11:p:1983-1999
    DOI: 10.1080/00220388.2020.1725483
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    Cited by:

    1. Gandhi, Sahil & Green, Richard K. & Patranabis, Shaonlee, 2022. "Insecure property rights and the housing market: Explaining India’s housing vacancy paradox," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    2. Paniagua, Victoria, 2022. "When clients vote for brokers: How elections improve public goods provision in urban slums," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).

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