The innovative bureaucrat: evidence from the correctional authorities in Washington State

Bureaucracies are usually regarded as inefficient, wasteful mechanisms. Contrary to this deeply rooted perception of bureaucracy, this paper documents the case of the correctional authorities in Washington State, a bureaucracy that acted with a considerable degree of innovation and professionalism. Their task was to administer a risk assessment instrument that measured the level of risk posed by offenders by way of a numerical score. They used that score to identify the level of supervision offenders were to receive once released into the community. In analyzing the data, I discovered an unusual application of the instrument that resulted in many offenders being bumped to a higher supervision level. Using a regression discontinuity design, I uncover the mechanics of the bumping-up process and I generate an instrument that is cleansed of the manipulation. I find that the manipulated instrument predicts serious recidivism events better than the cleansed instrument, especially when these events involve high-risk offenders, thus providing evidence that the authorities had good reason to undertake the manipulation.