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Allocation of Prizes in Contests with Size Effects

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  • Sanghack Lee
  • Shi-Young Lee

Abstract

We examine the allocation of prizes in contests in which the number of contenders affects the prizes and costs. We assume that there are two groups of contenders. The government allocates a prize to the two groups, and the contenders in each group respectively compete for the prize. Examining the prize allocation in such contests, we obtain the following results. The aggregate effort increases in the prize share of the larger group. In contests with size effects through costs, the aggregate resource expended in the contests and the aggregate payoffs are independent of group size distribution if the prize is allocated in proportion to group size. The integration of contests with size effects through prizes can yield higher aggregate effort and payoffs than the decentralized contests.

Suggested Citation

  • Sanghack Lee & Shi-Young Lee, 2015. "Allocation of Prizes in Contests with Size Effects," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(2), pages 343-358, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:intecj:v:29:y:2015:i:2:p:343-358
    DOI: 10.1080/10168737.2014.992034
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