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Calling the police as an interdependent security game

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  • P. Jeffrey Brantingham
  • George Mohler
  • Yevgeniy Vorobeychik

Abstract

Calling to report crime represents public cooperation with the police. When rational individuals are predicted to report (and when not) is still poorly understood. We study an interdependent security game under threat of a costly event that can only occur once or is perceived as so costly that the threat of the event occurring more than once is (in foresight) perceived as no more costly than the event occurring only once. Our analysis suggests how the interactions among the benefits, costs and neighborhood effects of police response might affect reporting. When there is spatial contagion of crime, rational individuals may choose to report when more of their neighbors report. When there is spatial contagion of deterrence, the relationship is reversed.

Suggested Citation

  • P. Jeffrey Brantingham & George Mohler & Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, 2025. "Calling the police as an interdependent security game," The Journal of Mathematical Sociology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(2), pages 109-129, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:gmasxx:v:49:y:2025:i:2:p:109-129
    DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2025.2458289
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