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An Experimental Test of Selectorate Theory

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  • Andrew W. Bausch

Abstract

This article uses a laboratory experiment to test one of the main predictions of selectorate theory, that is, that democratic leaders invest more resources in public goods than autocratic leaders. The results of the experiment confirm this prediction and further show citizens are better off on average under democratic institutions than autocratic institutions. Meanwhile, autocratic leaders receive higher payoffs than democratic leaders. Additionally, this article attempts to bring domestic politics into international relations experimentation with a focus on how communication may allow democracies to organize more efficiently for war than autocracies. A game theoretical model shows democracies have the potential to organize optimally and use their citizens’ skills to their full advantage while autocracies do not. The results of the experiment reveal some evidence that democracies organize more efficiently than autocracies, but that this increased efficiency did not produce a higher percentage of conflict wins.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew W. Bausch, 2014. "An Experimental Test of Selectorate Theory," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(4), pages 533-553, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:40:y:2014:i:4:p:533-553
    DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.891997
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    Cited by:

    1. Quiroz Flores, Alejandro & Pfaff, Katharina, 2021. "Private provision of public goods and political survival: Rail transport in four European democracies in the 20th century," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).

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