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Strategic Interaction in the 1994 and Earlier Cuban Refugee Crises

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  • Lester A. Zeager

Abstract

The 1994 Cuban refugee crisis is modeled as a prisoners' dilemma game for Cuba and the United States. A threat power version of the theory of moves yields a cooperative outcome in the game, sustained by mutual threats that deter defections by each player, which is consistent with moves made by the players. After the countries implemented deterrent threats, they agreed that Cuba would patrol its borders and the United States would admit 20,000 Cubans each year. We show that the analysis, suitably adapted, also illuminates strategic choices in the 1965 and 1980 Cuban refugee crises.

Suggested Citation

  • Lester A. Zeager, 2005. "Strategic Interaction in the 1994 and Earlier Cuban Refugee Crises," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(4), pages 327-348, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:31:y:2005:i:4:p:327-348
    DOI: 10.1080/03050620500303399
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