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Alliance Institutionalization and Alliance Performance

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  • Brett Ashley Leeds
  • Sezi Anac

Abstract

Military alliances are formed with varying degrees of institutionalization. While some alliances involve little initial investment or joint planning, others involve significant peacetime costs in establishing formal structures and engaging in military coordination. Several scholars have addressed the reasons states are willing to pay these governance costs in establishing cooperation—through controlling the risks of opportunism and coordinating policy more extensively, state leaders may be able to achieve higher benefits from cooperation. What has received less systematic empirical attention, however, is the comparative performance of highly institutionalized alliances. Are alliances that represent “deeper” cooperation more reliable than their less institutionalized counterparts? The newly expanded Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset includes detailed information about the institutionalization of alliances formed between 1815 and 1989. Using these data, we evaluate the effects of institutionalization on alliance performance. Surprisingly, we find no evidence that alliances with higher levels of peacetime military coordination or more formal alliances are more reliable when invoked by war. We speculate about directions for future research that might help to explain these results.

Suggested Citation

  • Brett Ashley Leeds & Sezi Anac, 2005. "Alliance Institutionalization and Alliance Performance," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(3), pages 183-202, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:31:y:2005:i:3:p:183-202
    DOI: 10.1080/03050620500294135
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    Cited by:

    1. Jesse C. Johnson & Brett Ashley Leeds & Ahra Wu, 2015. "Capability, Credibility, and Extended General Deterrence," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(2), pages 309-336, March.
    2. Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, 2008. "Alliances, Institutional Design, and the Determinants of Military Strategy," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 25(3), pages 224-243, July.
    3. Anderton,Charles H. & Carter,John R., 2009. "Principles of Conflict Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521875578, December.
    4. Andrew F. Cooper & Brendon J. Cannon, 2024. "Contested informality in regional institutional design: A comparative analysis of ASEAN and the Quad," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 15(1), pages 40-52, February.
    5. Brett V. Benson & Joshua D. Clinton, 2016. "Assessing the Variation of Formal Military Alliances," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 60(5), pages 866-898, August.
    6. Brett Ashley Leeds & Michaela Mattes, 2007. "Alliance Politics during the Cold War: Aberration, New World Order, or Continuation of History?," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 24(3), pages 183-199, July.
    7. Brett Ashley Leeds & Michaela Mattes & Jeremy S. Vogel, 2009. "Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(2), pages 461-476, April.
    8. Aaron Rapport & Brian Rathbun, 2021. "Parties to an alliance: Ideology and the domestic politics of international institutionalization," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 58(2), pages 279-293, March.
    9. Jesse C Johnson & Stephen Joiner, 2021. "Power changes, alliance credibility, and extended deterrence," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(2), pages 178-199, March.
    10. Jeehye Kim & Jiyoung Ko, 2020. "To condone, condemn, or ‘no comment’? Explaining a patron’s reaction to a client’s unilateral provocations," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 57(3), pages 452-465, May.
    11. John Conybeare & Dong-Hun Kim, 2010. "Democracy, Institutionalization, and Corporate Alliances," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(5), pages 715-744, October.
    12. Raymond Kuo & Brian Dylan Blankenship, 2022. "Deterrence and Restraint: Do Joint Military Exercises Escalate Conflict?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 66(1), pages 3-31, January.
    13. Jesse C. Johnson, 2016. "Alliance treaty obligations and war intervention," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 33(5), pages 451-468, November.
    14. Weber, Shlomo & Weber, Yuval & Wiesmeth, Hans, 2019. "Hierarchy of Membership and Burden Sharing in a Military Alliance," CEPR Discussion Papers 13965, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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