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Selection Effects and Deterrence

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  • James Fearon

Abstract

The empirical question of how often deterrent threats issued during international disputes succeed has been hotly debated for years, with some researchers arguing that virtually no robust cases of success can be identified. I argue that what appears to be an empirical and methodological debate actually arises from the inadequacy of classical rational deterrence theory, which fails to comprehend the implications of states' strategic self-selection into international disputes. Rational self-selection is shown to imply that in a sample of crises, deterrent threats issued after an initial challenge will tend to fail in precisely those cases where they are relatively most credible signals of an intent to resist with force. The product of a selection effect, this paradoxical implication allows a resolution of the debate on the efficacy of deterrence in crises. And because selection effects can arise whenever a historical "case" is the product of choices by actors who also influence the outcome in question, this example from the study of deterrence has broad relevance for empirical research.

Suggested Citation

  • James Fearon, 2002. "Selection Effects and Deterrence," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(1), pages 5-29, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:28:y:2002:i:1:p:5-29
    DOI: 10.1080/03050620210390
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    Cited by:

    1. Christian Fahrholz, 2007. "A Nash Threat Game of Passing Through Exchange Rate Mechanism II," Jena Economics Research Papers 2007-050, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    2. Kyungwon Suh, 2023. "Nuclear balance and the initiation of nuclear crises: Does superiority matter?," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 60(2), pages 337-351, March.
    3. Brandon Valeriano & Ryan C. Maness, 2018. "How We Stopped Worrying about Cyber Doom and Started Collecting Data," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 6(2), pages 49-60.
    4. Renato Corbetta, 2015. "Between indifference and coercion: Third-party intervention techniques in ongoing disputes," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 32(1), pages 3-27, February.
    5. Raymond Dacey, 2005. "The Status of Likelihood Claims in International Relations and Peace Science," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 22(3), pages 189-200, July.
    6. Muhammet A Bas & Curtis S Signorino & Taehee Whang, 2014. "Knowing one’s future preferences: A correlated agent model with Bayesian updating," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(1), pages 3-34, January.
    7. Molly M. Melin, 2015. "Escalation in international conflict management: A foreign policy perspective," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 32(1), pages 28-49, February.
    8. Renato Corbetta & Keith A. Grant, 2012. "Intervention in Conflicts from a Network Perspective," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 29(3), pages 314-340, July.
    9. Todd S. Sechser, 2011. "Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 28(4), pages 377-401, September.
    10. Brock F. Tessman & Steve Chan, 2004. "Power Cycles, Risk Propensity, and Great-Power Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(2), pages 131-153, April.

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