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Buying treaties with cigarettes: Internal side‐payments in two level games

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  • Chad Rector

Abstract

Two‐level games models predict that domestic division within a state can alter the extent to which that state is able to reach agreements with other states, and also alter the content of any agreement that is reached. I extend the model by introducing internal side‐payments composed of unrelated domestic issues. Domestic opposition to an international agreement will inhibit cooperation most when the executive and median legislators are in relative agreement about other salient domestic political issues. Domestic opposition to an international agreement will inhibit cooperation least when the executive and median legislators are in relative disagreement about other salient domestic political issues. U.S. ratifications of the NAFTA and the Chemical Weapons Convention illustrate that not all types of domestic division inhibit international cooperation—some can facilitate it

Suggested Citation

  • Chad Rector, 2000. "Buying treaties with cigarettes: Internal side‐payments in two level games," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(3), pages 207-238, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:27:y:2000:i:3:p:207-238
    DOI: 10.1080/03050620108434984
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