Crisis escalation: An empirical test in the context of extended deterrence

The effort to explain escalation processes using formal and empirical models has yielded numerous insights. However, there have been relatively few attempts to integrate these two approaches such that the results from an empirical test of escalation behavior are interpreted within and based on a well specified theory of escalation. This paper bridges that gap by developing a formal theory of escalation processes to derive hypotheses that identify the conditions under which states escalate in conflict. A player's decision to escalate or back down is based on an estimate of the opponent's cost tolerance—the maximum costs a player will withstand to achieve a demand in the game. The hypotheses derived from the theory are general and applicable in many contexts that involve escalation processes. In this paper, the hypotheses are tested empirically in the context of extended deterrence crises. The test confirms the theory's expectations and reveals strong support for the hypotheses. The theory offered here, I argue, provides a better explanation for the patterns found in the data than do the theories used in previous studies of extended deterrence.