Dispersing into the ether: a discourse on how the Ugandan government banished the LRA to the shadow realm

When Yoweri Museveni took power in Uganda in 1986, the NRM administration was faced with a press of problems. Of the plethora of insurgencies that emerged, the LRA perdured staging a virulent guerrilla campaign. Its leader, Joseph Kony, has long been one of Africa’s notorious warlords. For over three decades, his group has struck terror. Today, Kony’s firm grip on the rebellion is loosening. Recent defectors have suggested that he no longer enjoys absolute control. Short of declaring the end of the LRA menace, this article establishes that the prospects of this group overthrowing Museveni from distant bases in the remotest Kafia Kingi enclave in western South Sudan, where they collect and sell honey and alluvial gold, are unfeasible. What led to this outcome in the Ugandan civil war? Inasmuch as the government’s counterinsurgency efforts were focused on the pacification of Acholiland through population concentration; and, elimination and containment approaches of the LRA; Museveni also managed to build a network of regional and international coalitions. This strategy isolated the LRA and allowed for overt military interventions in Southern Sudan, DRC, and CAR. It is the meld of these strategies which combined to expel the LRA from Uganda.