Elite Coalitions and Rebel Control in Northern Côte d’Ivoire

How do armed movements gain civilian compliance and prevent counter-mobilization in localities under their wartime control? This paper argues that rebel capacity to control civilians is contingent on the coalitions formed between rebel mid-level commanders and elite groups embedded in local communities. Rebels are confronted with coalitional choices because local communities are contested and comprised of multiple sets of elite groups. Coalitional choices influence rebel control because they determine whether rebels ally with strong or weak local partners. Where rebel allies are weak, they should confront serious challenges to eliciting civilian compliance. Where rebel allies are stronger, rebels should confront less resistance. I argue that the availability of elites as potential allies for armed movements depends on their pre-conflict proximity to the state. This paper develops this argument through a comparison of three localities governed by the Forces Nouvelles (FN) in Côte d’Ivoire (2002–2011).